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INTRODUCTION TO THE COLLECTION 
Andrea Sauchelli 
This volume is divided into two parts: the first introduces Derek Parfit's Reasons 
and Persons (henceforth 'R&P'), whereas the second includes chapters that critic-
ally discuss recurring ideas in R&P. The chapters in this collection were written by 
different authors, and their styles and approaches slightly differ from each other. As 
tlie editor of this volume, I decided against imposing any strict requirements on 
its contributors, with the exception of reminding the contributors to the first part 
that their chapters are supposed to help the readers better understand the content 
of Parfit's book. Some of these writers adopted a more critical style, whereas others 
chose a more illustrative and exegetical approach. I think that they have all achieved 
the aim of introducing Parfit's book dearly, albeit in different ways. The chapters in 
the second part were commissioned with the intent of collecting works in various 
fields of philosophy that further elaborate on some ofR&P's principal themes and 
ideas.As will emerge from this brief introduction, the variety of the areas of research 
discussed in R&P is remarkable. 
Parfit's book has become a contemporary classic, widely read both by 
philosophers and scholars in 7cther fields (e.g. psychology and even economics). 
Parfit made several changes to the first edition of R&P published in 1984-the 
introduction to the 1987 edition contains a brief summary of these alterations.1 In 
its 1987 version, R&P comprises four parts and ten appendices. Regarding its con-
tent, R&P elaborates on several works that Parfit published from the early 1970s 
to the beginning of the 1980s. In fact, entire chapters are based on earlier material, 
albeit modified in light of the criticisms and suggestions Parfit received from an 
astonishing number of other influential philosophers (the long list includes the likes 
of Amartya Sen, Shelley Kagan, Larry Temkin, Bernard Williams and John Broome). 
Among the authors whose published works have more conspicuously influenced 
R&P, whether directly or indirectly, we may list: Henry Sidgwick, Thomas Nagel, 
David Wiggins and Bernard Williams. The success and enduring popularity of R&P 
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. hi h tandard of argumentanve ngour, . db ·ts·mpress1vely gs . • be Partially explame Y 1 1 dies discussed and the mteresnng may . • of the case stll ' 
the inventiveness and persp1cac1ty h the book. Furthermore, R&P touches 
d fi d d throug out 
and controversial_ theses e e_n arently disparate fields of philosophy-am~ng 
on a variety of different topics m app . hi personal identity and population . h normative et cs, 
others, rational choice t eory, . blems and issues that others (with rare 
ethics-and brings together various pro 
· ) h discussed only separately. nifyi" 
exceptions ave . 1 . d , there are recurring themes and u ng th gh R&P 'contams mu tltll es , 
Al ou . c 1 Parfit's attempt to show that one popular threads that run through it; ior examp e, . , fi . 
. all th Self-interest theory (S) is false.-To a mt approxuna-vers1on of what he c s e h h 
. · di ·d al rationality tells us that eac person as a supreme tion this theory about m VI u . 
. ' . · 1 that her life go for her as well as possible. Because rational ultimate aim, name Y, . . 
there are erent conce 1 difli Pt·ons of how a life can go well, and Parfit arms to provide 
arguments sufficiently general to apply to several vers~ons of S, ~e pai~stakingly 
explores the applicability of his arguments to the various ways m which S can 
be further understood.3 In turn, the recurring criticism of S is developed 'from 
different fronts'. More specifically, in the first part of R&P, Self-Defeating Theories, 
Parfit suggests that S, along with consequentialist theories of morality (C), may be 
indirectly self-defeating and possibly self-effacing. A theory T is directly individually 
self-defeating when there are cases in which it is certain that, if someone success-
fully follows T, she will thereby cause her own T-given aims (the aims given to her 
by the theory itself) to be more poorly achieved than they would have been if she 
had not successfully followed T. Parfit argues that S is not directly but indirectly 
self-defeating because there are people for whom it would be worse if they were 
disposed never to do what they believe would be worse for them. This point does 
not show that S fails on its own terms because, as a theory of individual rationality, 
S does not claim th t h · di ·d al 
a eac m VI u should never act irrationally. In fact, Parfit suggests that in certain cases ·t b · al . . 
. . 1 may e ration to act irrationally (there can be cases of rational irrationality) h • f, 
. -per aps Just or a short time-and this is compatible wnh S. Although not directly If d fi . 
b h . se - e eating, S and C are self-effacing because they may ot imply that we should t b Ii · 
c- Ii th ry to e eve m some other theory. For instance imp es at we should believe h h , 
would be best d ·a11 . t e t eory such that, if believed, the outcome -an , cruc1 y this p · • . . 
(a similar reasoning appli 's) omt IS compatible with not believing C itself es to . In additi d 
S can be collectively self-d f, . . on, an perhaps even more importantly, 
e eating. In part1cul ·d · • 
than one individual in whi h· (') h . ar, cons1 er situations involving more 
c · 1 t e achie f partly depends on what othe d ( .. ) vement O each person's T-given aims 
h h rs o, u what e h w at t e others do, and (iii) T . . ac person does will not determine diffc . is agent-relative· th . . . 
erent aims. Parfit claims tha h ' at is, It gives to different agents th t t ere are many · 
an no-one does what will b b cases m which if each person rather 
there ill b e etter for herself h c . 
w e a worse outcome fo ' or er 1amily, or those she loves, 
n_o~ everybody acted in a self-inrt everydone. Collectively, we . would be better off 
mdiVId al • . ereste way H 
fi u rationality, we may argue tha · owever, because S is a theory of re uted. The ab . . . t such cases do h . . . . 
ove criticism (be· ll . not prove t at 1t 1s dec1S1vely mg co ectively s If d fc . 
e - e eating) also applies to what 
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is termed common-sense morality-the rea b • ha . 
. rall . son emg t t this form of morality 1s gene y regarded as mcluding the idea th t h . 
b a we ave special moral obligations towards mem ers of our family, and that fc ll · h . . 
. . o owmg sue obligations may bring about s1tuanons that are collectively worse th th • hi 
. . an ose m w ch these obligations 
are not followed. As highlighted by Ben Egglest · hi · d 
. . . . . on m s mtro uctory chapter, the 
discussion m Part One 1s functional to the outliru·n f h ral • f g o t e gene traits o a new 
moral theory that does not suffer from the above p~oblerns d h nifi • an t at u 1es conse-
quentialism and certain aspects of common-sense morality ( Eggl , · 
bution for more details). see eston s contri-
After having discussed in Part One some arguments that do not seem to direct! 
refute S, in Part Two (Rationality and Time), Parfit proposes other arguments that a~ 
supposed to be sufficient to reject it. This section of R&P does not question our 
non-reductionist intuitions about our nature and continuity over time (more on 
non-reductionism later) and attempts to prove that S should be rejected for reasons 
that are compatible with different theories of personal identity.As outlined by Brian 
Hedden in his contribution, in this part ofR&P Parfit offers three main arguments 
against S. In particular, Parfit suggests that it may be rational not to care most about 
one's own well-being and to care at least as much for other things, the pursuit of 
which we may believe is not conducive to the best possible outcome for ourselves. 
Examples of desires for these things include the desire to sacrifice oneself (or, at 
least, not to maximise our well-being) for moral reasons or desires for achievements 
(or, better, for some achievements in certain circurnstances) .The latter are specified 
in a vaguely Nietzschean fashion because Parfit includes among them the desire to 
produce a great work of art despite regarding the fulfilment of such a desire as not 
leading to what is best for oneself (within reasonable limits) . Parfit's point is that 
these · desires may be no less rational than the desire for what the relevant agent 
deems best for herself.The second line of reasoning against S is focused on one ofits 
alleged faulty structural features, namely, the fact that such a theory is agent-relative 
(in specifying the aim that is rational for an agent to pursue, the theory makes essen-
tial reference to the agent herself) but time-neutral (in considering what is best for 
an agent, said agent should count the well-being of each temporal part of her life 
equally).Against this general structure, Parfit suggests that there are reasons t~ pref~r 
a theory that is either fully neutral or fully relative. The thi~ argument _against S IS 
based on the idea that it may not be irrational to be time-biased-for instance, to 
care more about some future parts of our lives rather than those_parts in th~ past.As 
for the rest of R&P, the subtle thought experiments and ingemous reasomng used 
fc h · h b n highly influential and have helped to shape the to argue or t ese pomts ave ee 
d tails Hedden's chapter. contemporary debate--for more e , see . 
The third part ofR&P (Personal Identity) contains ano~er rmportant and recur-
. k h .d th t chano-ing our beliefs about our nature and ring theme of the boo : t e 1 ea a o· . . . 
s for vanous issues m moral theory persistence may have important consequence . . 
.fi all p rfit's achievements m this part are at least 
and applied ethics. More speci ic Y, a 1 full d f, nds a version of what he 
d Ii d force Y e e twofold· first he clearly e neates an h • f al ·d u"ty) · , . . ( farnil of t eones o person 1 en will later call Constitutive Reductionism a Y 
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ail h ractical and moral consequences . . some det t e p "b th 
d cond he investigates in p Three decisively contn utes to e an ' se ' . 4 I this respect, art . . . 
f dopting such a view. n 1 . of personal identJ.ty 1s a necessary o a h !di of the re ation 
debate on whether the O ng. . (R) I this context, R can be understood 
h h t matters relation . n . 1£ .. h component oft e w a - . of our ratwnal se -concern. w en d ·nes the extension , 
as the relation that etermi at t, P's well-being is part of Q's. One of Parfit s 
p at t1 is R-connected to Q ·' h opinion of many other philosophers, . th t contrary to t e 
most debated theses is a ' I this paragraph, I will briefly summarise .d . • t what matters. n 
personal i entity is no . fi this conclusion. Parfit thinks that relation 
f hi I gthy reasomng or 
only part o . s en d f tw more fundamental relations that only partly 
R is exhaustively compose o o . . d h 1 . al 
nal ·d · amely psychological contmwty an psyc o og1c compose perso i entity, n 
h th h Jd in the right way. 
5 The amount and relevance of connectedness w en ey O • • 
· h 1 · al ec,.;ons between two persons at different tJ.mes, P and Q, direct psyc o ogic conn w. 
determine the degree of psychological connectedness between P and _Q. In several 
versions of the psychological view, when a strong degree of psychological connect-
edness is established, and chains of such connections hold between P and Q, we can 
say that p and Q are psychologically continuous. Examples of direct psychological 
connections between P at t1 and Q at tz include P's experiencing of an event at 
t1 an.d Q's recollection of it at tz, Q's acting at out of P's intention at t1, and so 
on. Crucially, given the nature of the relevant grounding relations, personal iden-
tity may be a matter of degree (this view contrasts with the theory that personal 
identity depends on a non-physical and non-psychological entity that is always 
determinate [e.g. a Cartesian Ego]). Due to the fact that personal identity includes 
a non-branching condition-roughly speaking, the relevant psychological relations 
should hold between at most two persons each at different times-and only the 
proper holding of the relevant psychological relations matter, personal identity is 
not a necessary conditi fi h 
. on or w at matters. In short, personal identity includes psychological connections c ti • h 
. . . , on nutty, t e non-branching condition and, on some versions of this criterion a condi . . 
hold (e.g. R h uld h ld'. . tlon regarding how these relations are supposed to 
s O o Ill virtue ofth · · 
brain). However R d contmmty of parts of the relevant person's 
' oes not necessarily . 1 d h 
Therefore, there are cas . hi me u e t e non-branching condition. 
es Ill w ch personal · d · 
hold. Parfit argues for thi 1 . i enuty and R do not coextensively . s cone us1on by I b . 
previously discussed by s d Sh e a oratmg on a thought experiment 
th y ney oemak:er and D "d w· . ere are cases of SYffimetr· fi . avi 1ggms. The upshot is that 
h l . ic issions-cases i hi h . . . 
c O ogical connections existi n w c an mdiv1dual's relevant psy-
p h ng at t1 are equall di .b ersons eac existing at a later ti y stn uted between two different 
to regard as b · me tz-the outcom f hi h . 
h emg as bad as death I hi es O w c It may be irrational t e conse · n t s pan of R&P p _quences of adopting a red . . . , arfit also elaborates on 
persona] identity d Ii uct1onist view (th 
• e neated above is e psychological account of 
Ill moral theory F one lOrm of red · . 
weight d . or example, he explores th "d uctiorusm) for other issues an scope to · e 1 ea that • 
to the de f certain principles of dist "b . we may assign a different gree o psych 1 . n ution (e ali my introduct h o ogica] connectedness h ldi . .g. equ ty) proportionally 
ory c apter for more details. o ng mtra- or inter-personally. See 
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Future Generations, the fourth part of R&P, begins with the claim that it is of 
utmost importance th~t a moral t~eory should address how we ought to behave 
towards futu~e genei:aoo~s. In partJ.cular, an acceptable unified moral theory {per-
haps of the kind outlined m Part One) should solve a series of puzzles and problems 
addressing, among other things, harm and beneficence towards future people. Some 
of these problems partly derive from the fact that our present choices affect not only 
the number and quality of life of future people but also their identity. For instance, 
the famous non-identity problem stems from an attempt to reconcile apparently plaus-
ible principles, some of which involve the existence of future people. In particular, 
some philosophers claim that an act can be wrong only if it makes things worse for 
some existing or future people (bad must be bad for someone), and that an act is not 
bad for someone if the act brings about the existence of such a person, provided 
that the life of this person is at least worth living ( or, at least, existence-conferring 
acts, acts unavoidable for the existence of an individual, do not make the existence 
they bring about worse) . Now, Parfit puts forward some cases involving actions that 
we would intuitively judge to be wrong but that are simultaneously unavoidable 
for generating lives that are at least worth living. For example, take the case of a 
14-year-old girl who decides to have a child and whose socioeconomic situation 
clearly suggests that she is unable to provide her child with a good start in life. Had 
she waited for several more years, she would have been able to give a better start in 
life to the other child she would have had. The life of the child she gives birth to is 
worth living but significantly worse than the life she could have given to the other 
child she would have had if she had waited several more years. Many people agree 
that the girl should have waited but can we say that, by not waiting, she has thereby 
harmed her actual child? How can we explain our initial intuition that the girl 
should have waited? According to Parfit, a satisfying moral theory should solve this 
problem and meet other requirements. These requirements include: (1) Avoiding 
the Repugnant conclusion-roughly speaking, the conclusion that it is better to have 
a large population of people whose lives are barely worth living than a population 
of significantly fewer people but with a much higher quality of life; (2) Avoiding 
the Absurd conclusion--consider two scenarios: in the first, there is a huge popula-
tion at t1 with a quality of life higher than our planet now in which one person in 
10 billion has a life of uncompensated suffering, whereas in the second scenario, 
there is a collection of populations of 10 billion each (as before, one person in 10 
billion has a miserable life) that do not interact with each other (e.g. each group of 
10 billion of these people lives at times after t1). If we impose a local limit on the 
value of positive quantity but not on negative quantity (for example, if we believe 
that there is a limit to the positive value that an increase in quantity can have at 
a specific time but also think that the disvalue of an increase in uncompensated 
suffering has no upper limit), then the first scenario is bad (because the quantity of 
suffering is not outweighed by the increase of quantity of positiv~ value), wher~as 
the second scenario is good (because the increase of quality outweighs the quantity 
of uncompensated suffering). However, this asymmetrical e~uation is abs~rd.Afi:er 
a painstaking discussion of these problems and possible solutions, Parfit claims that, 
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. fi all these requirements. See Roberts's h ry that saus 1es . 
•n R&P. he has found not eo . . fthese and related issues. 
i ' c. itical discuss10n o . Chapter on Part Four 1or a er rfi 1 cts this general pomt as a common . fR&P. Pa 1t se e 
In one of the final secuons O . b' k· , u reasons for acting should be more 
b l tfromhisoo.or · · theme or lesson to e earn d . th bri· ef introduction above, this idea has · ·an merge Ill e 
impersonal'.As 1t has paru Ye the a lication of his reductionism in personal 
taken different forms-for ~x~ple: fpp rson-affecting principles to solve the . rali d his reJecuon o pe . 
identity to mo ty, an h f Parfit's career can be seen as an mcreas-. bl In a way, t e rest o 
non-identity pro em. ti ' ther theoretical level) to further refine and ingly enriched attempt. (mos y at a _ra P. 
im rove on the conclusions reached m R& . . . 
p fthi 11 t'on comprises new ongmal papers on some of the The second part o s co ec 1 . . 
. . 6 · I ChrisoulaAndreou's chapter discusses some theoretical ideas m R&P. In partlcu ar, . . 
f Parfit, quandaries (and later elaborauons by other philosophers) consequences o s . 
1 d bl ms i·n value theory. In particular,Andreou considers the tran-on puzz es an pro e , . 
sitivity of the "better than" relation, using Parfit s w~r~ _on the Repugnant Conclusion 
as her starting point. Andreou considers the possibility of betterness cycles and 
the implications of accepting the intransitivity of "better than." She argues that 
if betterness cycles are indeed possible, then a distinctive form of satisficing that 
involves reasoning in terms ofleagues, plays a crucial role in proper reasoning about 
what to do. 
David Braddon-Mitchell and Kristie Miller's contribution outlines the concep-
tual terrain of what they call conative accounts of personal identity. These views 
have in common the idea that personal identity over time depends on conative 
phenomena such as desires, behaviours and conventions. In particular, the authors 
distinguish tliese conative views along three dimensions, namely, on the basis of 
(1) what role the conations play, (2) what kinds of conations play that role and 
(3) whether the conations that play that role are public or private. Braddon-Mitchell 
an~ Miller also evaluate such theories by adopting two key desiderata: accommo-
datmg faultless disagreement d da . . 
. . an accommo tmg our practICal concerns. Christian Coseru addre th fi 11 • . 
sses e o owmg questions: What justifies holding the person that we are today rall . 
F h . . mo Y responsible for something we did a year ago? urt er, why are we Justified · h . . 
of the ill m s owing prudential concern for the future welfare person we w be a yea & ? 
cannot be systemat· all r om now. Coseru suggests that these questions Ic Y pursued with t dd · 
tity. His chapter con ·d h h ou a ressmg the problem of personal iden-s1 ers w et er Buddhi R d . . 
grounded in the idea that st e uctiorusm, a philosophical project . persons can be red d . 
tual, dispositional and cons . 1 uce to a set of bodily, sensory, percep-c1ous e ements p • d 
criterion for personal identity C ' rov_1 es support for Parfit's psychological 
l . • oseru exanun h 1 P ays m mediating both s If. es t e ro e that self-consciousness fi . e -concern and con fc . 
or how reductionism about b . cern or others, offering an argument 
h . . su stantive or end . I . 
t e seemingly irreducible ch unng se ves may be reconciled with . . aracter of self. . 
Nilaruan Das and LA p 1 . . -consciousness. of . . au Investigate some hil . 
acts, namely, those acts that ch h P osophical aspects of a subclass 
A personally transforrnative act is oangehwbo_ we _are (personally traniformative acts). 
net at rings . 
Into eXIstence a future self that is 
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radically different from who th . 
b e agent previously was. In some of these cases the agent may e antecedently tai h h . ' 
h h . . cer n t at t e eXIstence of this future self although wort avmg will be u 'dabl fl . ' 
' . navoi Y awed, even if the future self values its exist-
ence. Howeve_r, if the agent does not perform the transformative act, she will not 
change so radically, so her unchanged future self may indeed be better off than her 
tr:ansfo~ed future self. In their chapter, Das and Paul argue that situations of this 
kmd rai~e a pro?le°:1 that is structurally similar to the non-identity problem. 
In ~s c?ntnbut1on to this collection, Dale Dorsey unravels some important 
t~eoret1cal issues related to the Self-interest theory (or prudence). In particular, he 
?1scusses a problem associated with the idea that, although the Self-interest theory 
1s not the whole story about practical rationality, many philosophers find it entirely 
plausible to hold that prudence is the best theory of rationality when it comes to 
normative self-concern, the idea being that, when our decision concerns only us, we 
have the strongest reason to promote our welfare to the greatest extent. However, 
prudence can seem alienating, especially in cases in which we are called upon to 
abandon deeply valued projects for the sake of projects we may have already taken 
on (or have yet to take on)-and yet, prudence seems precisely correct in cases of 
other, less significant welfare goods. Dorsey argues that this puzzle can be solved by 
holding that self-concern is not prudential. In particular, he claims that self-concern 
is not (or need not be) welfarist in nature. 
Carol Rovane focuses her attention on Christine Korsgaard's early critical 
response to Parfit's Reasons and Persons, in which Korsgaard pointed out that Parfit's 
reductionist account of personal identity did not take due account of the fact that 
persons are agents. In her contribution, Rovane offers a reductionist account of 
personal agency that takes this into account. In particular, Rovane's reductionism 
holds that the existence of a person consists in nothing but a certain sort of inten-
tional activity that stands in the right sorts of relations. The account also claims that 
persons are self-constituting in much the way that Korsgaard suggests. Rovane's 
form of reductionism, however, does not support Korsgaard's Kantian ambition to 
derive and ground an unconditional imperative of morality. Nor does it support 
the Kantian conception of the person of an end in itself, for it entails that per-
sons, qua agents, exist for the sake of the ends that their existence makes it possible 
to pursue--the ends for the sake of which they constitute themselves. Rovane's 
account agrees with Parfit's claim that we must revise our common_-se~se notions 
about the moral significance of the individual person.Yet it ~oes_ n~t mVIte the con-
sequentialist orientation that Parfit thought his own reducnon mv1~ed. . 
The last chapter of the collection, David Velleman's 'Non-idenucal and imper-
. · hro h h 1 of a broadly Kantian approach sonal', discusses several topics t ug t e ens . . 
to ethics. In particular, Velleman offers a solution to the non-idennty p~bl~m 
· · . h reiecting some of the utilitarian that resorts to the Categoncal Imperative, t us . 
. d h d b t O far Velleman claims that rather assumptions that have characterise t e e a e s · . 
. f h d benefit towards parncular people, we than focusing on the notions o arm an . d " 
11 
, 
nh d · Jf an be disrespecte . ve eman s should consider the idea that perso 00 itse c . . . th t . . . rfi , h on what matters-a cnnc1sm a chapter also contains a cnt1C1sm of Pa its t eses 
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Velleman advances from the perspective of his imaginability-based account of what 
matters and personal identity. 
Notes 
1 In particular, Parfit (1984/87: x). . . 
2 Even a lengthier summary of the book would be inadequate for c~pturmg ~e richness of 
R&P.The brief introduction in the main text will sidestep many important ISSues and be 
imprecise in certain important aspects. 
3 Parfit discusses in Appendix I, thoroughly analysed in Chris Heathwood's contribution, 
various different theories of well-being or welfare. 
4 See Parfit (1999) . 
5 A more precise formulation of relation R is given in a later essay, that is, Parfit (2007). 
6 With the exception of the short introduction rn Velleman's chapter, the descriptions of 
the chapters m Part II m the mam text are abndged versions of the abstracts sent b the 
authors. y 
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